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THE LAW OF PRIMARY ELECTIONS
INTRODUCTION.
"Ttie primary system has been so long and so generally
recognized that it has become an essential part of our political
system."' The first primary law was enacted in California in
March, 1866, closely followed by a New York act of April of
the same year. In 1871 Ohio and Pennsylvania and in 1875
Michigan followed suit. Since then the primary has spread
to all parts of the country.
The primary is not only a comparatively recent develop-
ment, but the great body of decisions relating either to the
principles of primary legislation or to details or regulations of
primaries have occurred in very recent years; not enough, in-
deed, have taken place to enable us to say that a well-defined
body of primary election law exists at the present time.
The present paper proposes, nevertheless, to examine the
decisions of recent years especially, with the purpose of classi-
fying them and indicating possibly'the general trend and the
possible future decisions of the courts on primary laws. We
shall first examine the decisions relating to primary acts per
se and then the various features of these acts and the subse-
quent laws passed to regulate primary elections.
1. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF PRIMARY LEGISLATION.
There have been very few cases in which primary laws
were attacked on the general principle involved; nearly all of
the attacks are devoted to specific points contained in the acts.
"The right of the legislature to require that nominations shall
be by primary and to prescribe additional qualifications for the
voters participating in same has been recognized by the weight
of authority in the states of the Union."'2 The attacks that
have been made have taken the form of declarations that pri-
mary laws deprive citizens of the right of forming political
parties-voluntary associations of men, holding political be-
' State v. Cole. (1911) 156 N. C. 618, 72 S. E. 221.
2 Ledgerwood v. Pitts, (1910) 122 Tenn. 571, 125 S. W. 1036. The
decision in this case is one of the best discussions of the questions
arising from primary legislation.
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liefs in common (such, at least, is the legal view of the reason
for party organization)-or that the legislature undertakes
to form parties for them; in other words, it is alleged that the
destruction of political parties is threatened. This 'view, how-
ever, is not upheld by the courts.3 It has even been declared
that where a statute attempts to regulate nominations, poli-
tical parties must be recognized, though they are voluntary
associations, since "we live in the days of party government."
4
This is analogous to the recognition of partnerships as actual
entities.
The following powers held to be inherently vested in the
legislature give it constitutional authority to enact a primary
law; authority to provide for registration, to regulate the suf-
frage, to protect the purity of elections, its power to determine
the manner of holding elections and the making of returns
therefrom; the only limitation that it cannot violate is a sec-
tion of the constitution in terms fixing who are entitled to the
right of suffrage.5 In line with this it has been held that the
legislature may provide for primary laws and the regulation
of the same when not prohibited by the constitution from so
doing.6 "The general assembly being, then, the depository of
all legislative power except when restrained by the organic
law, it follows that it is clothed with full power to enact a
primary election law, if there is no provision in the constitu-
tion depriving it of that authority."7 Primary election laws,
being of a highly remedial nature, are not in contravention of
the common law.
8
It would seem that in many cases the courts have adroitly
avoided being forced to declare as to the relative merits of the
primary and convention systems and the wisdom of primary
legislation by supporting such acts under the police power
and asserting that they are of a political nature with which
the court is not concerned. An appeal from the legislative
3 Hopper v. Stack, (1903) 69 N.J. L. 562, 56 Atl. 1; Katz v. Fitz-
gerald, (1907) 152 Cal. 433, 93 Pac. 112; Riter v. Douglass, (1910) .32
Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444. This case probably embodies a discussion of
a greater number of primary law problems than any other.
4 State v. Houser, (1904) 122 Wis. 534, 1,00 N. W. 964.
5 Riter v. Douglass, (1910) 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444.6 Kenneweg v. County Commissioners, (1905) 102 Md. 119, 62 Atl.
249; State v. Miles, (1908) 210 Mo. 127, 109 S. W. 595; Primary Elec-
tion Case (Mclnnis v. Thames), (1902) 80 Miss. 617, 32 So. 286.
7 Kenneweg v. County Commissioners. supra.
8 State v. Swanger, (1908) 212 Mo. 472, 111 S.W. 7.
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decision must be made to the people rather than to the courts.'
"A proper administration of the affairs of a sovereign state
vitally affects the welfare of the existence of its citizens, and,
where such a matter of vital importance is at stake, the state
has the right, under the police power vested in its legislature,
to make such reasonable regulations in the interest of public
welfare for the nomination of the candidates of the various
parties as it may determine" and the advisability of such leg-
islation "is a matter solely for the legislature to determine."'01
Primary laws, as any other laws, must not contravene gen-
eral constitutional provisions. They must be reasonable.",
Primary laws have been upheld as not invalid as denying elec-
tors the right to determine the political principles their can-
didates must espouse or enabling the electors of opposite poli-
tical faith to name the candidates of their opponents;"' they
are not invalid as impairing the right of citizens to assemble
together and instruct their representatives.' 2 Nor are they
invalid as using public funds for the use of private or voluntary
associations. 13 It was argued that taxation to suppqrt prim-
aries was not due process of law. This view was untenable,
said the court, since the protection of the purity and expedi-
tion of elections is a fundamental function of state govern-
ments, unabridged by the constitution.
The completeness of the law and the sufficiency of the title
are technical questions which have been invoked against prim-
ary legislation. Such laws should be complete in all their
terms and conditions. 14  Not only must the title be sufficient
but there must be only one subject and that expressed in the
title.'" The legislature has the power to frame regulatory
9 State ex rel. Zent v. Nichols, (1908) 50 Wash. 508, 97 Pac. 728.
10 Riter v. Douglass, (1910) 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444. In accord
see Hopper v. Stack, (1903) 69 N.J. L. 562, 56 Atl. 1; State v. Felton,
(1908) 77 Ohio St. 554, 84 N. E. 85.
11 Ladd v. Holmes, (1901) 40 Ore. 167, 66 Pac. 714. See also State
ex rel. Nordin v. Erickson, (1912) 119 Minn. 152, 137 N. W. 385.
12 Katz v. Fitzgerald, (1907) 152 Cal. 433, 93 Pac. 112. See also
State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, (1910) 142 Wis. 320, 125 N. W. 961,
20 Ann. Cas. 633.
'3 State v. Felton, (1908) 77 Ohio St. 554 84 N. E. 85. Cf. Kenne-
weg v. County Commissioners, (1905) 102 Md. 119, 62 Atl. 249.
14 People v. Election Commissioners, (1906) 221 II1. 9, 77 N. E. 321;
Rouse v. Thompson, (1906)'228 Ill. 522, 81 N. E. 1109.
2 Rouise v. Thompson, supra; Ledgerwood v. Pitts, (1910) 122
Tenn. 571, 125 S. W. 1036; State v. Drexel. (104) 74 Neb. 776, 105
N. W. 174; State v. Mitchell, (1909) 55 Wash. 513, 104 Pac. 791.
Laws held not to violate such provisions in: State v. Cox, (1911)
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laws and decide their terms; this power cannot be again dele-
gated."8
Primary laws and laws to regulate primary elections must
likewise meet the requirement of uniformity. The problem is
to see just how this requirement has been interpreted by our
courts. Citations are not necessary to support the general
statement that all laws and regulations must be reasonable,
uniform, and impartial. But the mere fact that a law has only
a local application does not prevent its being a general or
public law, for it may be uniform in its operation as to a par-
ticular class."7 And legislation may be class legislation but not
be repugnant to the constitution if it is at the same time gen-
eral.I8 Let us now examine some of the laws considered.
Laws exempting certain offices from the primary election
are not unconstitutional on the ground of special or class legis-
lation."9 A law providing for and regulating the holding of
primaries in a certain county was upheld with, seemingly,
little opposition.20  That but one city falls in a class attempted to
be regulated does not make a law invalid.21 Both these latter
234 Mo. 605, 137 S.W. 981; Commonwealth v. Wilcox, (1911) 111 Va.
849, 69 S. E. 1027; State v. Bethea, (1911) 61 Fla. 60, 55 So. 550; Social-
ist Party v. Uhl, (1909) 155 Cal. 776, 103 Pac. 181; Morrow v. Wipf,
(1908) 22 S. D. 146, 115 N. W. 1121; State ex rel. Zent v. Nichols, (1908)
50 Wash. 508, 97 Pac. 728; -State v. Michel, (1908) 121 La. 374, 46. So.
430.
16 People v. Election Commissioners, (1906) 221 Ill. 9, 77 N. E. 321.
Power given the county central committee to decide whether nomina-
tions should be by (1) voters or delegates chosen at primary, or (2) by
majority or plurality vote: Held, invalid delegation. Cf. Morrow v:
Wipf, supra.
In Rouse v. Thompson, supra, the county committee was given
power to ddtermine the delegate districts in county. Void.
17 Ladd v. Holmes, (1901) 40 Ore. 167, 66 Pac. 714.
Is Hodge v. Bryan, (1912) 149 Ky. 110.. 148 S.W. 21.
19Hodge v. Bryan, supra; Ledgerwood v. Pitts, (1910) 122 Tenn.
571, 125 S.W. 1036.
20 State v. Cole, (1911) 156 N. C. 618, 72 S. E. 221. A California law
of 1895 applying to two counties only was declared unconstitutional,
since in this case it was held that a law having uniform operation
could be made applicable. Marsh v. Hanley, (1896) 111 Cal. 368, 43
Pac. 975. An act applying a different standard to Cook than to the
other counties in Illinois was held to conflict with the constitutional
prohibition of special laws regulating county affairs. People v. Com-
missioners, (1906) 221 Ill. 9, 77 N. E. 321.
21 Ladd v. Holmes, (1901) 40 Ore. 167, 66 Pac. 714. In accord
see Hopper v. Stack, (1903) 69 N. J. L. 562, 56 At. 1; Commonwealth v.
Commissioners, (1914) 22 Pa. Dist. 674; Kesler v. Commissioners,(1914) 22 Pa. Dist. 678. Contra: opposing the last two cases is Com-
monwealth v. Commissioners, (1914) 22 Pa. Dist. 654. A law applying
only to cities of the first grade of the first class was declared uncon-
stitutional. City of Cincinnati v. Ehrmann. (1899) 6 Ohio N. P. 169.
THE LAW OF PRIMARY ELECTIONS
statements have, however, been denied by the courts, as will
be seen by an examination of notes 20 and 21. The legislature
has been held to have the power to distribute the expense of
primary elections by imposing the expense of a city primary
on the county wherein it is located,22 but it is doubtful, in the
writer's opinion, whether such legislation would be generally
upheld by the courts.
Summing up the doctrines set forth in the decisions of the
courts we may say that primary laws and statutes regulating
primary elections are upheld because of the public importance
of securing proper party nominations; but that they must not
contravene constitutional provisions. Many of these provisions
relate specifically to elections; the question, which will be
treated in the following section, therefore arises, as to whether
primary elections are "elections" in the sense in which the
term is used in the constitution or in general statutes. The
conservative view is that they are, even though the primaries
were not a part of the election system at the time of framing
the constitution or passing the acts.2 3 Other courts, however,
question the applicability of provisions framed when the pri-
mary system was not in use.24
The whole primary act or regulatory statute may or may
not fall when a particular portion of the same is declared un-
constitutional. If tfie invalid part goes to the root of the act
and is vital to its existence, then the whole law will be invalid.
But if the void part is not of such a nature as to render the
continued operation of the other sections of the law impossible
or illogical then the remaining portions .will stand. To put it
in another way, we should ask the question, "Would the legis-
lature have passed the act, or statute without the section
regarded as invalid?"
2. Is A PRIMARY AN "ELECTION?"
Introduction. The importance of this question, as just
stated, is very great. If the primary is to be regarded as an
election within the meaning of every reference to that term in
the constitution and general statutes then the ability to legally
include many provisions in primary election laws is either
22 Ladd v. Holmes, supra.
23 People v. Election Commissioners, (1906) 221 Ill. 9, 77 N. E. 321.
24 Winston v. Moore, (1914) 244 Pa. St. 447, 91 Atd. 520, Ann. Cas.
1915C 498, L. R. A. 1915A 1190.
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abolished or greatly restricted. To illustrate: the constitution,
let us say, provides for the secrecy of the ballot. Granting,
for the sake of argument, though the courts are not unanimous
by any means on the point, that the secrecy of the ballot is
invaded by requirements for the voter to designate his party
affiliation, then the very important question arises as to whether
the primary should be included in the constitutional provision.
Or bets on any election are prohibited. Does the primary come
within the term "any election ?" An attempt will be made to
analyze the decisions on various laws and provisions before
forming our conclusions as to what the judgment of the courts
seems to be.
A. Laws and Statutes in General Considered. It has been
held that the word "election" as used in some constitutional or
statutory provisions includes primary elections.2 5  And pri-
maries have been held to be "elections" within a constitutional
provision prescribing qualifications of electors at "all elections
authorized by law"2 6 and within the provision of the Bill of
Rights saying "all elections shall be free and equal. '27  The
effect of these decisions is to say that primary laws and regu-
lations must not contravene constitutional and statutory pro-
visions relationg to elections. 28
On the other hand many cases hold that laws and constitu-
tional provisions regulating elections in keneral do not apply
to primaries.2 9 They are not within a constitutional require-
25 Commonwealth v. Commissioners, (1914) 22 Pa. Dist. 654. A
qualified decision.
26 Spier v. Baker, (1898) 120 Cal. 370, 52 Pac. 659, 41 L. R. A. 196. In
accord Marsh v. Hanley, (1896) 111 Cal. 368, 43 Pac. 975; and Britton
v. Election Commissioners, (1900) 129 Cal. 337, 61 Pac. 1115, 51 L. R. A.
115.
27 People v. Election Commissioners, (1906) 221 Ill. 9, 77 N. E. 321.
This is but one of a number of -Illinois cases in accord: People v.
Den'een, (1910) 247, Ill. 289, 93 N. E. 437; People v. Strassheim, (1909)
240 Ill. 279, 88 N. E. 821; Rouse v. Thompson, (1906) 228 Ill. 522, 81
N. E. 1109; Sanner v. Patton, (1895) 155 Ill. 553, 40 N. E. 290.
28 Other cases holding on principle that a constitutional or statu-
tory refereice to "any election" includes primaries are: Leonard v. Com-
monwealth, (1886) 112 Pa. St. 622, 4 Atl. 220; State v. Hirsch,
(1890) 125 Ind. 207, 24 N. E. 1062, 9 L. R. A. 170; Ex parte Wilson,(1912) 7 Okla. Cr. 610, 125 Pac. 739; State ex rel. Ragan v. Junkin,(1909) 85 Neb. 1, 122 N.W. 473; Johnson v. Grand Forks County,(1907) 16 N. D. 363, 113 N. W. 1071.
29 State v. Johnson, (1902) 87 Minn. 221, 91 N. W. 604, 840; in ac-
cord see State ex rel. Nordin v. Erickson, (1912) 119 Minn. 152. 137
N. W. 385; Ledgerwood v. Pitts, (1910) 122 Tenn. 571, 125 S. W. 1036;
State v. Flaherty, (1912) 23 N. D. 313, 136 N. W. 76; Line v. Board of
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ment that "all elections shall be equal."30 Primary elections to
choose delegates to conventions are not within constitutional
or statutory requirements.21 Primary elections are not part of
the general election because held at the same time as the latter,
and using the same machinery merely for convenience and
economy ;32 the same case held that primaries were not "general
elections" within the constitutional guaranty of the secrecy of
the ballot at a general election. Primaries are not elections
within the common-law meaning of the term.
33
A typical illustration of the reasoning of those holding that
a primary is an election is found in the following :34
"The words 'primary election,' we may say, are as well
understood to mean the act of choosing candidates by the
respective political parties to fill the various offices, as the
word 'election' is to mean the final choice of all the electors of
the persons to fill such offices. So that the words 'any election'
clearly include primary elections, and such elections come
within the letter of the statute."
By courts taking the opposite stand it has been declared
that the words in the constitution referred to elections for office
and not to elections for party nominations ;35 a similar view
was taken by another court in saying the primary is merely a
Election Canvassers, (1908) 154 Mich. 329, 117 N. W. 730, 16 Ann. Cas.
248; People v. Cavanaugh, (1896) 112 Cal. 674, 44 Pac. 1057, later over-
ruled; State v. Simmons, (1915) 117 Ark. 159, 174 S. W. 238.
In the opinion in United States v. Gradwell, (1917) 243 U. S. 476,
61 L. Ed. 857, 37 S. C. R. 407, Justice Clarke seems to believe that the
word "elections" as used in the constitution would not include primary
elections. He says: "Primary elections, such as'it is claimed the de-
fendants corrupted, were not only unknown when the constitution was
adopted, but they were equally unknown for many years after the law
(in question) was first enacted." But Justice Clarke is very careful
to note that the court is not called upon to decide the question whether
primaries are "elections," as "such admission would not be of value
in determining the case before us."
30 Montgomery v. Chelf, (1904) 118 Ky. 776, 82 S. W. 388, 26 Ky.
Law Rep. 638. Cf. with People v. Election Commissioners, (1906) 221
Ill. 9, 77 N. E. 321.
31 State v. Woodruff, (1902) 68 N. J. L. 89, 56 Atl. 204; People v.
Cavanaugh, (1896) 112 Cal. 674, 44 Pac. 1057, overruled in Spier v.
Baker, (1898) 120 Cal. 370, 52 Pac. 659., 41 L. R. A. 196.
32 State ex rel. McCue v. Blaisdell, (1908) 18 N. D. 55, 118 N. W.
141.
33 State v. Woodruff, (1902) 68 N. J. L. 89. 56 At1. 204. Decision
applied only to primaries to choose delegates to convention. Quaere,
would the same rule be applied to primaries to choose candidates to
represent the party in the general election?
34 State v. Hirsch, (1890) 125 Ind. 207, 24 N. E. 1062, 9 L. R. A. 170.
35 Hester v. Bourland, (1906) 80 Ark. 145, 95 S.W. 992.
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substitute for the caucus or convention. 6 "A primary election
is not an election to public office. It is merely the selection of
candidates for office by the members of a political party in a
manner having the form of an election." The elections referred
to in the statute were "elections where persons are given public
offices by a plurality of the votes of all the electors voting
thereat.37
B. Some Specific Provisions of Primar Laws. Primary
elections have been held not to be within the meaning of a
statute permitting the use of voting machines at all state,
county, city, village and township elections ;38 nor within a
constitutional declaration of the necessary qualifications of
electors.3 9 A primary election law making no provision for
leaving blank spaces on the ballots as required in the consti-
tution at all elections, is not void. 40 In another case the court
distinguished between the oath of fealty to a party as a can-
didate and the oath made on taking office. 4' Laws providing
for the determination of contested elections do not apply to
primary election.4 2  The above cases all declared, directly or
indirectly, that primaries are not elections.
But there is no unanimity of opinion on the question even
in interpreting specific statutes or provisions and saying
whether they shall be put into effect. Primaries have been
declared within constitutional provisions prescribing the qual-
ifications of voters at "any election.4 3  Constitutional provi-
sions as to the mode of nominating and number of nominees
must be regarded.44
C. Criminal Statutes and Corrupt Practices Provisions.
Primary acts have been held not to be within the meaning of
36 Ledgerwood v. Pitts, (1910) 122 Tenn. 571, 125 S. W. 1036.
3 Line v. Board of Election Canvassers, (1908) 154 Mich. 329, 117
N. W. 730, 16 Ann. Cas. 248.
8 Line v. Board of Election Canvassers, supra.
39 State v. Johnson, (1902) 87 Minn. 221, 91 N. W. 604, 840; State
ex rel. Zent v. Nichols, (1908) 50 Wash. 508, 97 Pac. 728.
40 State v. Johnson, supra.
41 Riter v. Douglass, (1910) 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444.
42Jones v. Fisher, (1912) 156 Iowa 582, 137 N. W. 940; Hester v.
Bourland, (1906) 80 Ark. 145, 95 S.W. 992.
43 ohnson v. Grand Forks County, (1907) 16 N. D. 363, 113 N. W.
1071, later overruled; People v. Strassheim, (1909) 240 Ill. 279, 88 N. E.
821.
44 People v. Strassheim, supra; Rouse v. Thompson, (1906) 228 Ill.
522, 81 N. E. 1109; People v. Election Commissioners, (1906) 221 Ill.
9. 77 N.E. 321; People v. Deneen, (1910) 247 Ill. 289, 93 N. E. 437.
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statutes prohibiting a wager on the success of any candidate
at "any election," in a leading case.45 Similarly, statutes mak-
ing it a misdemeanor to place any bet or wager on any election
do not apply to primaries.46 Going still further in this line, a
statute disqualifying a person from holding office during term
elected for when he shall have given a bribe, threat, or reward
to secure his election, was held not to apply to primaries."
Nor is it an offence for officials at primaries to electioneer, when
the general election laws forbid it.
4 s
But a statute forbidding fraudulent voting at a primary was
sustained as valid under the Pennsylvania constitution49 pro-
viding for the disqualification for holding office and the depri-
vation of the right of suffrage of anyone convicted of wilful
violation of the election laws. 50 Primaries have been held to be
within the letter and spirit of a statute prohibiting the sale of
intoxicants on "the day of any election."5' 1 A general criminal
statute referring to "elections" applies to the "September
primary."15
2
Analysis and Conclusions. Can any general conclusions as
to the tendencies of our courts be drawn from the conflicting
opinions cited? Let us review the cases and discover how
many courts adopt each view.
45 Commonwealth v. Wells, (1885) 110 Pa. 463, 1 Atl. 310. Over-
ruled in Leonard v. Commonwealtth, (1886) 112 Pa. 622, 4 AtI. 220.,
46 Lillard v. Mitchell, (Tenn. Ch. App. 1896) 37 S.W. 702; Com-
monwealth v. Helm, (1887) 9- Ky. L. Rep. 532; Dooley v. Jackson,
(1904) 104 Mo. App. 21, 78 S. W. 330.
47 Gray v. Seitz, (1904) 162 Ind. 1, 69 N. E. 456.
48 State v. Simmons, (1915) 117 Ark. 159, 714 S. W. 238.
4 Pa. Constitution, Art. 8, Sec. 9.
50 Leonard v. Commonwealth, (1886) 112 Pa. 622, 4 At. 220.
51 State v. Hirsch, (1890) 125 Ind. 207, 24 N. E. 1062, 9 L. R. A. 170.
Overruled in Gray v. Seitz, (1904) 162 Ind. 1, 69 N. E. 456. The de-
cision in State v. Hirsch may be explained by the general tendency
which has existed for the courts to interpret laws in a way they would
not otherwise do when the liquor interests are concerned.
52 State v. Robinson, (1912) 69 Wash. 172, 124 Pac. 379. But it is
doubtful if this should be considered as fully upholding the principle
that primaries are elections, since the court upheld Commonwealth v.
Wells, (1885) 110 Pa. 463, 1 Atl. 310, and endeavors to distinguish the
facts in this case from those in the Pennsylvania case. What the court
says in effect is: The words "any election" as used in general election
laws or a constitutional article on elections do not apply to primaries;
as used in general criminal statutes or other statutes not aimed at or
concermed with elections per se they will apply.
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Supporting the view that primaries are elections we have a
number of decisions from the Illinois supreme court. 3 Most
of the Illinois cases rest on the cumulative voting provisions
of the constitution, the courts declaring they must be made to
apply at the primaries. In Oklahoma and Nebraska the courts
have supported the Illinois view; in California, Pennsylvania,
and Washington they have done so by overruling former deci-
sions, but in the latter state the decision applies only to a
limited extent.
I In the following states the contrary position has been
uniformly taken: Minnesota, Tennessee, Michigan, Arkansas,
Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada and Iowa. In Indiana and North
Dakota decisions holding that primaries are elections have been
overruled. A New Jersey decision to this effect applies only to
a limited extent. The Tennessee and Nevada cases are perhaps
the best discussed of the recent cases involving the validity of
primary laws and provisions.54
Eliminating the Washington and New Jersey decisions, as
offsetting each other, we have five courts supporting the view
that primaries are elections and ten holding that they are not.
In the writer's opinion the tendency is to hold that they are
not; but as new state constitutions are framed and statutes
drawn with more skill the problem will to some extent be
solved in the future. At present, however, it must be consid-
ered in the framing of any primary bill or regulation of pri-
maries, and in determining their constitutionality.
3, REGULATIONS REGARDING PARTIES.
The principal question arising in this connection is the
attempt to exclude the smaller parties from the primaries.
Such laws typically say that parties not having polled a certain
percentage of the total vote cast at the last general election
shall not be entitled to a place on the primary ballot.
The principle underlying such laws is upheld by the courts,
and the author has been unable to find any cases in which laws
were declared unconstitutional merely because smaller parties
53These decisions are reviewed and attacked by Professor L. M.
Greeley of Northwestern University in 4 Ill. L. Rev2'227-42 and 5 Ill.
L. Rev. 502-08. People v. Czernecki, (1912) 256 Ill. 320, 100 N. E. 283,
seems to in some measure hold the opposife view, but not sufficiently
so to permit us to say that they are overruled.
54 Ledgerwood v. Pitts, (1910) 122 Tenn. 571, 125 S. W. 1036; Riter
v. Douglass, (1910) 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444.
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were excluded. "The legislature has the undoubted right, in
the regulation of primary elections, to prescribe qualifying
classification for political parties who desire to avail them-
selves of the privilege of getting on the official ballot through
the means prescribed by law."5
The necessity for such classification has been pointed out.
"Some classification is made necessary, else any two, three, or
four men might call themselves a party, and impose the burden
of placing their candidates upon the ballot provided by the
state law . . . a condition which could easily be made in-
tolerable to the state, as well as to the voter."5 6 The.court in its
argument from a hypothetical case has, as courts are prone to
do, greatly exaggerated and magnified the possible evils; still,
there is a germ of truth in the court's statement, at least as far
as the principle goes. One of the best analyses is that made in
State v. Phelps,57 "Some test of party capacity, having refer-
ence to numbers, for representation on the official ballot is
necessary. Otherwise the number of parties and names of
candidates. might be so great as to render the single ballot
sheet unsuitable for exercise of the constitutional right to
vote." Three arguments were used to uphold the court's con-
clusion; (1) to keep the ballot within a reasonable size such
regulation is necessary; (2) "to promote such party integrity
as the only legitimate basis for legal conservation of party
existence, as to discourage electors, claiming to belong to one
organization from invading the primary of another ;" (3) "to
stimulate exercise of the right to participate by voting in the
activities of the social state," with particular emphasis on the
first of these, the latter two, indeed, seeming to be somewhat
stretched for the purpose of argument.
It would seem that restrictions of the nature referred to
are constitutional only when independent nominations may be
made by petition.5
Laws have been upheld in which parties not having polled
1 per cent of the total vote in the last preceding general election
55 Riter v. Douglass, supra.
56 Katz v. Fitzgerald, (1907) 152 Cal. 433, 93 Pac. 112.
5 State v. Phelps, (1910) 144 Wis. 1, 128 N. W. 1041.
58 Ex parte Wilson; (1912) 7 Okla. Cr. 610, 125 Pac. 739; Riter v.
Douglass, (1910) 32 Nev. 400, 109 Pac. 444.
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were excluded from the primary;r9 2 per cent ;60 3 per cent;61-
5 per cent ;62 10 per cent ;63 and 20 per cent.64 A law restricting
the primary to the two parties which had polled the largest vote
was upheld. 65 The primary of the largest party was to be held
first.
Unless such restrictions were imposed there would be no
limit to the number of parties and candidates whose names
would appear on the official ballot. Where a party is unable
to hold a primary or to participate in the general party, either
because of legal restrictions, or because it would be imprac-
ticable for it to do so, it may nominate by convention. While
it is lawful to prescribe a condition as to numerical strength
and to classify, yet such classification cannot be arbitrary. The
court may very properly inquire as to (1) the rationality of the
classification; (2) the imposition of unequal burdens; (3) the
conferring of special privileges.
A primary law providing for a limitation of 20 per cent in
Cook county and 10 per cent in the state as a whole was
declared unconstitutional as being special and local legislation
and as interfering with equality of rights and the freedom of
the voters in the different counties.66 A law that only parties
having polled 3 per cent of the total vote could use the pri-
maries to elect'delegates to state conventions, was held invalid
as class legislation; the smaller parties were practically pre-
vented from having conventions, though they might place their
59 State v. Drexel, (1904) 74 Neb. 776, 105 N. W. 174.
60 Corcoran v. Bennett, (1897) 20 R. I. 6, 36 Atl. 1122.
61 Ladd v. Holmes, (1901) 40 Ore. 167, 66 Pac. 714; State v. Poston,
(1898) 58 Ohio St. 620, 51 N. E. 150, 42 L. R. A. 237; De Walt v. Bartley,(1892) 146 Pa. 529, 24 Atl. 185; Katz v. Fitzgerald, (1907) 152 Cal. 433,
93 Pac. 112; Matter of Ward, (1902) 36 Misc. Rep. 727, 74 N. Y. S. 403,(affirmed 69 App. Div. 615, 75 N. Y. S. 1134).62 Ransom v. Black, (1892) 54 N. J. L. 446, 24 Atl. 489, 16 L. R. A.
769; State ex rel. Hagerdorn v. Blaisdell, (1910) 20 N. D. 622, 127 N. W.
720.63 State v. Jensen, (1902) 86 Minn. 9, 89 N. W. 1126; Davidson v.
Hanson, (1902) 87 Minn. 211, 91 N. W. 1124, 92 N. W. 93; State ex rel.
Webber v. Felton, (1908) 77 Ohio St. 554, 84 N. E. 85; State v. Michel,(1908) 121 La. 374, 46 So. 430; Ledgerwood v. Pitts, (1910) 122 Tenn.
571, 125 S.W. 1036.
64 State v. Phelps, (1910) 144 Wis. 1, '128 N. W. 1041. The vote
must have been 20 per cent of that cast for governor in the official dis-
trict.
65 Kenneweg v. County Commissioners, (1905) 102 Md. 119, 62
Atl. 249. Slightly different from the general form of primary law; for
our purposes, it must be remembered, it makes little difference whether
a law is mandatory or optional.
66 People v. Election Commissioners, (1906) 221 II. 9, 77 N. E. 321.
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candidates on the general election ballot in another way.6 7 A
provision that the primary should not be used by any party
to make rominations in any district where the party's vote
had not been at least 30 per cent of that cast for secretary of
state at the last general election, was unconstitutional as
arbitrary, unnatural, and not uniform.68
A law providing that nominations by petition must be, for
certain offices, of 5,000 votes, not over 500 in any county, was
declared unconstitutional, as depriving the voters in counties





67 Britton v. Election Commissioners, (1900) 129 Cal. 337, 61 Pac.
1115, 51 L. R.A. 115.68 State v. Hamilton, (1910) 20 N.D. 592, 129 N. W. 916; overrul-
ing State v. Anderson, (1908) 18 N.D. 149, 118 N. W. 22. But cf.
State v. Phelps, (1910) 144 Wis. 1, 128 N. W. 1041.
69 State ex rel. Ragan v. Junkin, (1909) 85 Neb. 1, 122 N. W. 473.
This question of nomination by petition is also discussed in People v.
Smith, (1912) 206 N. Y. 231, 99 N. E. 568; People v. Britt, (1912) 206
N.Y. 246, "99 N. E. 573.
